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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Flores appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Mr. Flores argued in
his Appellant’s Brief that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the
officer who stopped the vehicle in which Mr. Flores was traveling never investigated the traffic
violation which purportedly formed the basis for the stop, but instead conducted a drug
investigation from the outset, which was not supported by reasonable suspicion of drug activity.
He submits this brief to respond to the State’s argument on this issue.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Flores included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant’s
Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein. (Appellant’s Br., pp.1-3.)

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Flores’ motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Flores’ Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Officer Esparza testified he pulled over the vehicle in which Mr. Flores was travelling

because he “was advised that this was a stop that they needed because of possibly some drug
business going on at an address.” (11/30/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-7.) While another officer, Officer
Durbin, had observed a turn signal violation, Officer Esparza was not aware of the nature of the
observed violation. Thus, Officer Esparza could not, and did not, investigate the violation. From
the outset, Officer Esparza was conducting a drug investigation, which was not supported by
reasonable suspicion of drug activity.

Because Officer Esparza never pursued, and thus

abandoned, the traffic investigation, and because he lacked reasonable suspicion for a drug
investigation, his seizure of Mr. Flores violated Mr. Flores’ rights under the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.

B.

Officer Esparza Abandoned From The Outset The Legitimate Purpose Of The Stop,
Which Was To Investigate The Traffic Violation
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Flores argued his seizure was unlawful from the outset

because the officer who stopped the vehicle in which he was travelling was not aware of the
nature of the alleged traffic violation, and thus could not investigate the violation. (Appellant’s
Br., pp.6-8.) The State argues in its Respondent’s Brief that Mr. Flores’ claim fails “because it
effectively nullifies the collective knowledge doctrine.” (Respondent’s Br., p.9.) The State is
incorrect.
Under the collective knowledge doctrine, the question of whether an officer has
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop is determined based on the totality of the
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circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop, including the collective knowledge of
all the officers and dispatchers involved. See State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 678 (Ct. App.
2007); State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964 (Ct. App. 2004). Under the collective knowledge
doctrine, as first articulated by the United States Supreme Court, an officer can make an
investigatory stop in reliance upon a report or bulletin from another law enforcement officer and
need not have personal knowledge of the facts that underlie the report. See United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985). The question is whether the officer who issued the report
had the requisite reasonable suspicion. Id. at 232. The collective knowledge doctrine thus
eliminates the requirement of personal knowledge, but it does not eliminate the requirement of
knowledge.
In State v. Baxter, for example, the Court of Appeals held an officer had reasonable
suspicion to detain the defendant where the officer was informed via dispatch that a known
citizen had alerted the police to the location of a man who had a valid arrest warrant issued for
him. 144 Idaho at 677. In Wilson v. Idaho Transportation District, the Court of Appeals held an
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle to investigate whether the driver was driving
under the influence of alcohol where, among other things, the officer was able to verify the
details conveyed to him by a third party prior to initiating the stop. 136 Idaho 270, 275-76
(Ct. App. 2001). In both cases, the collective knowledge doctrine was used to eliminate the
requirement that the facts supporting reasonable suspicion be grounded in the officer’s personal
perceptions and inferences. See id. at 275. But the collective knowledge doctrine does not allow
an officer to stop a vehicle without knowing the facts which establish reasonable suspicion for
the stop.
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The State asserts that because the actions Officer Esparza took after stopping the vehicle
in which Mr. Flores was traveling were “routine and appropriate actions for a traffic stop,” the
purpose of the stop was never abandoned, and Officer Esparza was diligently pursuing the traffic
investigation. (Respondent’s Br., pp.8, 14.) But the fact that Officer Esparza was performing
some of the tasks that are routinely done as part of a traffic stop does not mean he was diligently
pursuing the traffic investigation. It is true that, in determining whether to issue a traffic ticket,
an officer can check the driver’s license, run a warrants check, and inspect the vehicle’s
registration and the driver’s proof of insurance. See Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135
S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015). But these checks are secondary to the police investigation of the
traffic violation. See id. at 1614. The purpose of the stop is to address the violation, see id., and
that purpose is necessarily abandoned where the officer is unaware of the nature of the violation.
Here, the record reflects that Officer Esparza was not aware of the particular facts
surrounding the alleged traffic infraction prior to stopping the vehicle in which Mr. Flores was
traveling, and never investigated the alleged violation for purposes of determining whether to
issue a traffic ticket to the driver. Officer Esparza testified as follows at the preliminary hearing:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

So your involvement in this case began when you received a call over
your radio; correct?
Correct.
And did that call come from Officer Lueddeke?
I don’t recall who initially called in. I was listening to radio traffic, and I
overheard them talking about a vehicle they were following.
And you know why there were following it?
Initially, no, until I just – and then I heard that they needed – that – of the
violations, they needed a patrol vehicle to stop it. And so that’s where I
picked it up.
Were you familiar with an investigation into an address, 360 Moskee
Street?
I was not – I did not realize where it was coming from until later. Then I
was advised what the stop was for. Or just prior to me stopping, I was
advised that this was a stop that they needed because of possibly some
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drug business going on at an address. But I didn’t recognize what the
address was at the time.
(11/30/16 Tr., p.21, L.9 – p.22, L.7.)
A seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as the officer “diligently
pursues the purpose of the stop.” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609 (2016). If, however, the
officer abandons the purpose of the stop, the officer has effectively created a new seizure which
“cannot piggyback on the reasonableness of the original seizure.”

Id.

Officer Esparza

abandoned the only legitimate purpose of the stop from the outset, as he conducted a drug
investigation rather than a traffic investigation. Mr. Flores’ seizure thus violated his rights under
the Fourth Amendment.

C.

The District Court Erred In Concluding, In The Alternative, That The Stop Was
Supported By Reasonable Suspicion Of Drug Activity
Mr. Flores argued in his Appellant’s Brief that the district court erred in concluding there

was reasonable suspicion of drug activity prior to the stop of the vehicle. (Appellant’s Br., pp.811.) The State asserts the district court correctly concluded there was reasonable suspicion for a
drug investigation based on the reports of stop-and-go traffic at the Moskee residence, the quick
and evasive driving pattern of the vehicle in which Mr. Flores was traveling, and the observation
of a child not wearing a seatbelt in the back seat of the vehicle. (Respondent’s Br., p.16.) These
facts do not give rise to reasonable suspicion of drug activity. The district court erred in
concluding otherwise, as it relied upon information contained in the Affidavit for Search
Warrant, dated November 1, 2016 (“the Affidavit”), which was prepared after the stop at issue,
and included information obtained from the stop itself. (Motion to Augment, Ex. A.) The State
also argues the officers knew who Mr. Flores was “immediately after identifying him by his
driver’s license.” (Respondent’s Br., p.16.) This is, of course, true. But the fact that the officers
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were able to identify Mr. Flores after he was stopped cannot be considered in determining
whether the stop itself was supported by reasonable suspicion.1 See State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439,
443 (2015) (“‘The suspicion for the stop must be based upon objective information available to
the officer when he decided to make the stop, and cannot be bolstered by evidence gathered
following the stop.’”) (quoting State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 (Ct. App. 1991)).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Flores respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

1

The State appears to argue, for the first time on appeal, that the stop was also reasonable
because it allowed the officers to investigate the welfare of the child who was observed to be
unrestrained in the back seat. (Respondent’s Br., p.16.) The State does not cite any authority for
this proposition, and it is directly contradicted by Idaho law. The fact that a child may be
unrestrained in a vehicle does not provide an officer with a basis for a traffic stop. See I.C. § 49673(5) (stating enforcement by law enforcement officers of the safety restraint requirements
“may be accomplished only as a secondary action when the operator of the motor vehicle has
been detained for a suspected violation of another law”).
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